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MANEUVER CAPTAINS CAREER COURSE CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BRITISH TACTICAL FAILURE AT THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS BY CPT BOBBIE RAGSDALE MANEUVER CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FORT BENNING, GEORGIA 11 JULY, 2012 At The Battle of New Orleans, the British Army suffered their worst loss ever in proportion to their numbers.1 Indeed, it was among the most decisive land battles in history, and certainly the most significant American victory of the War of 1812. During General Edward Pakenham’s main assault, for which major action lasted less than 30 minutes, British casualties numbered upwards of 3,000 while those of the American defenders totaled less than 60 – only 13 killed.2 The causes for this resounding defeat were many, and the noble defensive efforts by the Americans under the command of Major General Andrew Jackson are not to be discounted. Nevertheless, the failure of the British main assault at The Battle of New Orleans on January 8th, 1815 can largely be attributed to their failure to effectively incorporate what we now consider to be the Characteristics of Offensive Operations: Concentration, Surprise, Tempo and Audacity. BACKGROUND In late December, 1814, a British invasion force anchored and disembarked several miles south of New Orleans, setting up camps along the bayous and swamps between the east bank of the Mississippi River and Lake Borgne. General Jackson assembled a motley crew of pirates, farmers, Indians, militia and Army Regulars to meet them. As additional British forces slowly arrived over the next several weeks, they conducted several skirmishes and probing attacks to reveal the nature of the American defenses while simultaneously revealing to the Americans the direction and likely nature of British attack. Jackson, so informed, began immediate construction of earthworks and defensive batteries along Rodriguez Canal, approximately five miles downriver from New Orleans. By January 8th, his ramparts, five feet high and up to twenty feet thick in places, ran the length of the open plantation ground from the river to the cypress swamps in the east.3 Eight batteries and a forward, riverside redoubt – designed to fire enfilade along the front of the breastworks – defended Line Jackson, as the Rodriguez Canal defenses came to be called.4 Across the river – a mile wide at this point – Commodore Daniel Patterson arranged nine marine guns in four firing positions to deliver enfilading fire into the 500-yard-deep American primary engagement area.5 6 Additionally, Jackson deployed Choctaw Indian scouts to screen and defend in the severely restrictive eastern swamps where the ramparts could potentially be flanked.7 In the face of overwhelming defenses and a clearly defined engagement area, Major General Sir Edward Pakenham, the British ground forces commander, considered moving the attack to the west bank, which remained relatively undefended.8 Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, the senior commander of the invasion force, however, overruled him, arguing that it would take too long and that there were not enough boats to support the move.9 Resigned, Pakenham devised a plan for a frontal attack; he would lead the main assault against Line Jackson while Lieutenant Colonel William Thornton would head a smaller “surprise attack” against Patterson on the west bank.10 Pakenham’s main assault would consist of two primary attacks: one at Jackson’s center, composed of 2,600 soldiers from the 93rd Highlanders and 95th Rifles to be led by Major General John Keane, and another of equal size at Jackson’s more lightly defended left, toward the swamps, composed of the 44th Foot, 21st Foot and 4th Foot to be led by Major General Samuel Gibbs.11 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rennie would lead a smaller column of companies from the 43rd Light Infantry, 93rd, 7th Fusiliers, and West Indian Infantry along the river to seize the forward redoubt.12 Keane was to remain flexible, prepared to reinforce Gibbs or Rennie as necessary.13 Major General John Lambert would command the 2,000-man reserve, comprised of the 7th Fusiliers and 43rd Light Infantry.14 Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Dickson would construct three artillery batteries during the night to support their movement from the south, the purpose of their fires being to suppress the American artillery.15 16 Unlike earlier engagements during which the British artillery attempted to breach the American earthworks, they would make no attempt this time.17 Knowing that a breach would be necessary, though, Pakenham delegated the task to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Mullins and the 44th Foot, who would lead Gibbs’ column.18 Engineers would construct ladders and fascines (bundles of cane) for 300 soldiers of the 44th to carry; the remainder of the 44th would form a support-by-fire position. Soldiers with fascines would lead, dropping their bundles into the canal and then joining the support-by-fire. Likewise, the ladders would follow across the fascines and, after being placed against the breastworks, their transporters would move aside similarly, allowing the remainder of Gibbs’ column to assault through the breach lane into the American line. To ensure proper tempo, no shots would be fired until they were upon the breastworks and ready to execute the breach.19 Thornton, meanwhile, would lead a force of 1,400 men and some light artillery across the river under darkness to seize Patterson’ s marine battery and turn it against Line Jackson before the main assault.20 Cochrane’s sailors would dig a canal through the levee to float barges from their camp into the river.21 It was a complicated plan.22 Said Quartermaster William Surtees, “Nothing could exceed the grandness of the conception.”23 Preparations for the battle did not go as planned, however. Two days earlier, on January 6th, captured British sailors confirmed to the Americans what previous British deserters had already been saying: a massive attack was coming on the 8th.24 25 Worse yet, a local planter, Pierre Denis de la Ronde, rode to the British encampment and dined with them; assuming him to be anti-American, British officers described their plan to him in detail. Following their meal, he returned to Jackson and informed him personally of the British plan.26 The night prior to the battle, as Thornton prepared to cross, Cochrane’s canal collapsed and the barges mired.27 Struggling to drag their barges through mud to the river, Thornton’s men were only able to cross 450 of their number, unfortunately without artillery, and later than expected.28 He would not take Patterson’s battery before dawn as planned. Soldiers and engineers toiled through the night to construct Dickson’s batteries, but they reencountered the same problems that they had – and should have learned from – during earlier engagements; the Louisiana soil, muddy and wet, was not suitable for supporting the heavy guns.29 At daybreak, Dickson reported the batteries as “not half finished.”30 Perhaps most damning was the general ennui among British officers that night who viewed the Americans as less than worthy opponents.31 32 While Surtees and two other officers walked the route over which the Army would march the next morning, not a single other officer apparently felt this reconnaissance necessary. He remarked: I was sadly disappointed at our not meeting with any other commanding officers engaged in this most necessary duty… But here all seemed apathy and fatal security arising from our too much despising our enemy. I did not at all feel satisfied with what I had seen and heard and retired to rest with a considerable degree of despondency on my mind. … I almost felt confident of [our] failure 33
The Battle
At 0400 on the 8th, Gibbs and Keane started their movements from the British camp to the battlefield.34 The morning was thick with fog from the river; visibility was severely limited, to the British advantage.35 As planned, 500 yards short of Line Jackson, their columns split – Gibbs to the right and Keane to the left – and they quickly lost sight of each other.36 Rennie found his position near the levee and Lambert waited with his reserve a quarter-mile behind Gibbs.37 Mullins, despite being ordered to do so, had not properly identified the location of the breaching equipment the night prior.38 As such, he marched his column past the redoubt at which they were kept, believing them to be at a forward battery.39 Upon reaching said battery and finding an alarming lack of breach equipment, he discovered his error. He sent 300 men back to the redoubt to retrieve the tools while he waited.40 They recovered the equipment as quickly as they could. Burdened by their new, heavy loads and fighting their way upstream through the columns already assembled, though, they struggled to return in time and in proper formation to be of use.41 At 0500, Pakenham awoke for breakfast and received the disappointing news of Thornton’s failure.42 43 Making matters worse, the fog, upon which Pakenham relied for obscuration during the assault through the American engagement area, broke upon sunrise.44 The British formations, arrayed at one-quarter and one-half mile from Line Jackson, became fully visible to the American defenders who were expecting them.45 46 Feeling committed to the battle at this point, the disheartened general ordered the remainder of Thornton’s men to Keane’s column and prepared for the losses that Patterson’s marine guns might inflict.47 He then gave the order to fire two rockets; Jackson himself observed their glow and correctly remarked, “That is their signal for advance, I believe.”48 Initially in silence, the British marched, sixty abreast and four deep, bayonets fixed.49 When they closed the distance to 500 yards, the American line opened fire with their artillery. The British immediately responded, training their guns on the sound of the American guns.50 Despite suffering tremendous casualties from the opening barrages, the columns continued to advance.51 Soon after the shooting began, the soldiers of the 44th, with ladders and fascines, caught up with the rest of their regiment at the forward battery.52 Moving out briskly to catch the rest of Gibbs’ column, the lead company turned down the wrong road, advancing in the wrong direction.53 Gibbs’ quickly identified the error and sent the order to Mullins, who righted his entire column except for the offending lead company, which did not receive the order.54 The 44th was now spread out into multiple, parallel columns, and was utterly disorganized, with ladders now ahead of the fascines.55 Gibbs’ columns continued to advance, but once within 300 yards, the American sharpshooters opened fire.56 They fired their rifles in three to four ranks, rotating such that one rank was nearly always firing.57 58 After the first volley, volley-fire was abandoned in favor of individual efforts, with the Americans firing and loading as quickly as possible.59 The British were unprepared for these tactics and the results were devastating. As reported by Quartermaster E.N. Burroughs: In less time than one can write it, the Forty-fourth Foot was literally swept from the face of the Earth. In the wreck and confusion that ensued within five minutes the regiment seemed to vanish from sight. … Every mounted officer was down at the first fire.60
The 21st and 4th, having seen the 44th break completely and flee in all directions, immediately stalled in the American engagement area, dropping into ditches and tall grass to avoid the deadly rifle fire and await orders.61 Across the field, the 95th, followed by the 93rd, advanced while taking severe casualties, both from rifle and artillery fire to the front and from the grapeshot and cannon across the river.62 Finally, unable to face continued losses, the 95th broke ranks and dove for nearby ditches. The 93rd Highlanders remained in formation, but halted and lay down in wait of further orders.63 Further west, along the river, Rennie’s column advanced quickly, the levee protecting them alone from Patterson’s marine battery.64 As they approached their objective, the forward American redoubt, he ordered them prone beside the levee to rest momentarily while he assessed the situation.65 Though protected by the levee, he was still taking casualties to the front and right. Knowing that he could not remain in the engagement area, he ordered his men forward and they charged the redoubt. The Americans noticed his effort and diverted forces to repel his attack; they were not enough to stop him, though, and he seized the redoubt, albeit losing two-thirds of his force in the process.66 Having gained the initiative, he looked to maintain it, but could not penetrate Line Jackson without reinforcements.67 Fixed by rifle fire, they hunkered down and waited for support.68 Keane’s orders were to support Rennie if he seized the redoubt, or support Gibbs if Thornton failed to route Patterson.69 Both conditions being true, Keane was seemingly free to follow his intuition. Immediately prior to the battle, however, having lost all faith in Thornton’s mission and wanting to distance Keane from Patterson’s guns, Pakenham rode to Keane and instructed him to assist Gibbs and ignore Rennie.70 He ordered him to cross the field in a right-oblique formation after the battle began, and so he did.71 With the 95th having already broken and taking cover in ditches, Keane advanced with the 93rd, 100 men abreast.72 The move attracted considerable attention and the American guns assailed his formation; the 93rd commander was killed as they closed to within 150 yards.73 Receiving an order to halt that he issued immediately prior to his death, the 93rd did exactly that; with his subordinate commanders either unwilling or unable to take charge, the proud Highlanders stalled before the ramparts, perfectly disciplined and suffering murderous fire.74 Shortly afterward, Keane too was wounded and removed, unconscious, from the battlefield.75 Having taken casualties amassing over 85% of their strength, the 93rd ultimately broke and fled.76 Gibbs, meanwhile, rallied his forces behind the remnants of the 44th and advanced again.77 The American fire did not slow, however, and the 44th dropped their breach equipment to return fire, against orders.78 Other regiments followed suit, and their movement slowed all the more.79 At Gibbs’ insistence, the 21st advanced, stepping around and over the bodies of the 44th that lay in front.80 Determined to breach with or without the ladders and fascines, a small detachment actually reached the ramparts and, climbing upon one another’s shoulders, entered the American lines.81 The fire was overwhelming, though, and those that reached the breastworks were all killed or captured immediately.82 At this, Gibbs lost all control of his formation and the 21st broke completely, its soldiers in “full flight. ”83 Rennie remained in control of his seized redoubt for the time being, but the American rifle fire prevented him or his men from standing to see the battlefield.84 Finally, using American prisoners as human shields, they were able to rise and observe the dire nature of their condition.85 Indeed, they became aware that as the attacking columns collapsed, the Americans began shifting forces to counterattack the redoubt.86 Realizing that no reinforcements would come, he ordered a fateful charge over the lone plank across the canal and into the breastworks; he and many men died without ever crossing Jackson’s line.87 The remaining force retreated as quickly as they could, taking continued fire and casualties as they did.88 More than half of the British force on the field had fallen. American Colonel William Butler remarked, “No officer on horseback could be seen, and such as had escaped death or wounds were running as fast as their legs could carry them to the rear – anywhere to get out of the reach of those awful rifles.”89 Some soldiers, seeing no other escape from the slaughter, hid behind their dead companions, waiting until the battle’s end to surrender or retreat.90 Unable to remain in the rear any longer, General Pakenham rode into the field with his aide to salvage the battle. Gibbs reported that his men no longer obeyed him, so Pakenham took charge.91 Riding into the field amongst the routed and fleeing soldiers, he cried, “Shame! Shame! Remember you’re British! Forward, gentlemen, forward!”92 Inspired by their general’s presence, a number of soldiers resumed the charge, led by Sir Edward himself; he was then immediately shot from his horse, which was itself also shot. Undaunted, he commandeered his aide’s horse and charged a second time, upon which he was shot a second, and third time. Mortally wounded, he fell and was carried from the battlefield, but not before issuing a final order that Lambert commit the reserves. In executing that order, however, the bugler was wounded, and the reserves were never activated.93 A staff officer found General Gibbs and informed him of Pakenham’s wounds, adding that Gibbs was now in command.94 Either out of frustration or in an effort to once again rally his soldiers, Gibbs charged the ramparts himself; he and his horse were brought down in a hail of gunfire and he died later that day.95 96 By this time, Thornton managed to finally silence Patterson’s guns with his small detachment, but it was too late.97 The entire British main assault was either dead, captured, surrendering or retreating.98 British Lieutenant George Gleig recalled that “all was confusion and dismay. Without leaders, ignorant of what was to be done, the troops first halted and then began to retire, till finally the retreat was changed into a flight, and they quitted the ground in utmost disorder.”99 General Lambert, the lone remaining general officer, assumed command and deployed his reserves to cover the retreat.100 The 7th and 43rd advanced slowly, expecting a counterattack, and then took cover in ditches to avoid becoming casualties themselves.101 102 The strategy was unsuccessful and soon they were also in full retreat, fleeing by squads.103 Captain John Cooke of the 43rd recalled the disaster, saying, “Regiments were shattered, broke, dispersed – all order was at an end.”104 In a last effort, Lambert sent a West Indian detachment through the swamp in an attempt to flank Jackson’s left.105 They got close to the line, but mired and those who didn’t drown were captured by the Choctaw scouts.106 His army a shambles, Lambert returned to the British headquarters where Cochrane ordered him to renew the attack. 107 With two-thirds of his force removed from the fight, he ignored the Admiral and ordered Thornton’s forces to return, forfeiting their gains on the west bank.108 109 Some Americans crossed the breastworks to take prisoners and render aid to the wounded, but Jackson prohibited a counterattack.110 111 The battle having begun shortly after sunrise, the American infantry ceased fire “for lack of targets” at 0830; artillery stopped at 1400.112 According to figures from the British Army Medical Director, the British suffered over 850 killed and nearly 2,500 wounded during the battle.113 Of note, the 93rd Highlanders were reduced to 132 of their original thousand, and the 44th Foot to 134 of its original 816; of their 31 officers, 5 remained. Other units bore similarly tragic losses. By contrast, the Americans endured 13 killed and 39 wounded.114 Analysis “Surprise, Concentration, Tempo, and Audacity characterize the offense,” according to US Army doctrine.115 Unquestionably, in the face of their overwhelming defeat, the British main assault at New Orleans failed to properly account for and incorporate any of these four principles. What follows is a critical examination of their failure, by characteristic, in order from least to most egregious. “Concentration is the massing of overwhelming effects of combat power to achieve a single purpose.”116 If Pakenham’s purpose was to penetrate Jackson’s defenses to seize New Orleans, he seemingly made no effort to concentrate his fires to achieve it. While his infantry was organized into three, mutually supporting columns, with Gibbs apparently as his decisive effort, his artillery was not designed to set conditions for success at his decisive point (Jackson’s left). Rather, they were spread out and ordered to conduct counter-battery fire against the American guns, which were distributed across Line Jackson, instead of concentrating them at a single point.117 Worse still, while small-arms fire proved to be among the most casualty-producing American weapons, Dickson’s batteries were ordered not to fire until they could hear the musketry, inexplicably forfeiting the standoff that they could have achieved by prepping the defensive works with indirect fire before the assault.118 Some failures were just a matter of poor planning. When Keane crossed the field to Gibbs, Dickson was unexpectedly forced to silence his guns while the column crossed his sector of fire.119 Despite having occupied the territory to the south since December, the batteries were still not complete by the start of the battle.120 Doctrine is clear that commanders must “integrate Fires with Maneuver throughout offensive operations,” but Pakenham failed to successfully incorporate Fires into his plan and he sacrificed Concentration as a result. 121 “In the offense, commanders achieve surprise by attacking the enemy at a time or place he does not expect or in a manner for which he is unprepared.”122 It is not unreasonable to declare that Surprise was impossible by the morning of January 8th, as the British quite clearly attacked at both the time and place the Americans expected, and in a manner for which they spent a month preparing. Having conducted several probing attacks in the weeks prior, they made their presence, tactics and likely avenue of approach apparent. Despite this inexorable truth, no serious attempt was made to develop a new plan of attack.123 Making matters worse, the British deserters and prisoners, as well as local planter de la Ronde, each informed Jackson of the British plan in varying degrees of detail, removing all doubt.124 125 Even their signal to advance (rocket fire) was clear and unmistakable to all.126 Historian Wilburt Brown encapsulates the situation nicely when he remarks, “There was no hope of a surprise.” 127 “Controlling or altering Tempo is necessary to retain the initiative.”128 While Pakenham planned to control the Tempo of the fight, his subordinate commanders were unable to execute his plan. In order to ensure rapid execution of the breach operation, the infantry was ordered not to fire – and thus, not to stop advancing – until they reached the canal.129 Under the severe conditions, however, British discipline was pushed to the limit, and the 44th dropped their breaching equipment to return fire, losing initiative.130 Their hesitation in the enemy’s engagement area made them easy targets.131 Commanders must use Tempo to “prevent defenders from massing effects against the friendly decisive operation.”132 So easy were the British targets that nearly every advancing column broke and fled during the assault, in part due to the defenders’ ability to isolate and mass effects on individual units as they approached the canal. Even the retreat lacked Tempo; the reserve advanced slowly, expecting a counterattack, likely costing more lives than if they had seized initiative in their covering mission.133 Ultimately, they themselves also broke under the relentless and massed American fires.134 The most critical disaster of Tempo was the failure to exploit Rennie’s seizure of the Americans’ outworks at the riverside redoubt. Rennie’s column had finally seized the initiative for the British forces, but Pakenham ordered away their only reinforcements. “Commanders never permit the enemy to recover from the shock of the initial assault,” but he had done exactly that.135 Despite his noble efforts, Rennie was unable to continue the assault alone. By failing to maintain Tempo, the Americans were allowed to successfully counterattack, and the British were driven from their lone foothold into the American defenses.136 Some of the failure regarding Tempo, though, can be attributed to British military culture. Traditionally, the British Army of the age was not conducive to individual initiative; rather, it was a culture of top-down leadership. This was apparent throughout the battle: the 95th froze directly in front of the American defenses when their commander was killed;137 the 21st and 4th took cover and waited for orders when they became confused during their initial assault;138 even the retreat took longer than necessary as soldiers were unclear of what to do without being expressly told.139 Given their culture as it was, in the face of the relentless loss of their officers, it was near impossible for the British to maintain Tempo. “Audacity is a simple plan of action, boldly executed.”140 Pakenham’s failure of audacity is two-fold and polar. First, the plan was complicated.141 Second, “boldly” is not the same as “brashly;” attacking through an enemy’s engagement area is not the same as being wisely audacious. Rather, it is foolish. In other words, his plan was simultaneously less than simple and more than bold. The British main assault involved no less than ten moving pieces, not including Thornton’s forces on the west bank.142 Last minute changes further complicated matters.143 From interrupting Dickson’s indirect fire plan to leaving Rennie unexpectedly without support, changes desynchronized efforts across the battlefield.144 145 Moreover, the nature of the plan led to general confusion and complication, even without changes. The 44th split when lead elements marched in the wrong direction, and again when they missed the breaching equipment.146 Ladders and fascines flipped positions, yielding the initial breach plan unfeasible.147 Captain Cooke marched his column in the wrong direction entirely, being unclear of where he fit into the battle and following only the sound of gunfire through the smoke and mist.148 The plan, seemingly sound on paper, could not withstand the complications of reality. More importantly, though, was the overall aim of Pakenham’s plan to assault through the Americans’ clearly defined engagement area, seemingly justified by hubristic nationalism alone. As Surtees observed, no commanders reconnoitered the route from camp or took preparatory measures the night before the battle, secure in their confidence of perceived American weaknesses.149 The assembled Americans were fighting together for the first time while the British were veterans and professionals.150 During planning, Admiral Cochrane rejected his generals’ reservations about the attack; so poor was his opinion of the American defenders that he claimed his 2,000 sailors would take the city themselves, should the army be unable.151 Doctrine goes on to say, “Army forces dictate the terms of combat and avoid fighting the enemy on his terms.”152 Officers are taught not to attack through an enemy’s engagement area if at all possible. If ultimately necessary, extraordinary measures must be taken to mitigate the enemy’s ability to deliver his planned effects into that engagement area. Pakenham took some measures toward mitigation, but each ultimately fell through: the attack was to begin at night, but was delayed until daytime; fog was to obscure the battlefield, but it lifted at sunrise; Thornton was to silence the enfilading fires and turn Patterson’s guns before the assault, but he was late; Dickson’s batteries were to silence the American guns, but they weren’t finished in time.153 154 Knowing of these setbacks, and in spite of the fact that he could have postponed the battle, Pakenham ordered the attack to continue anyway.155 As a result, the British formations suffered catastrophic losses throughout the extremely short battle. Across the entire battlefield, the Americans inflicted murderous wounds on the British columns. A 32 lb gun, packed with musket balls, destroyed the center of one column in a single shot.156 Riflemen engaged out to 400 yards with accuracy, while the British, powerless to stop it, continued their disciplined advances.157 So horrendous was the display that American officers became emotional at the sight, looking away as their riflemen fired through tears.158 Colonel Butler remarked to General Jackson, “Magnificent, isn’t it, General?” “Magnificent,” he replied, “But is it war?”159 When the battle was all but over, Pakenham rode into the field reminding those retreating that they were, in fact, British, as though that fact alone should enable them to overcome the inferior Americans’ relentless fires.160 Felled shortly thereafter while leading his men to the canal, Pakenham caught notice of Jackson’s aide who remarked, “That British officer certainly acted the hero at the last.” Upon reflection, Jackson answered, “When our intellect fails us, we have to become heroes.”161 Conclusion The Battle of New Orleans will forever remain one of the most lopsided battles in the history of warfare. While many circumstances must align any time an event of this significance occurs, the British leadership certainly did not take appropriate measures to prevent it. Central to their failure was the inability to properly account for and incorporate the timeless ideals that US Army doctrine currently refers to as the Characteristics of the Offense, namely Concentration, Surprise, Tempo, and Audacity – especially Audacity. General Sir Edward Pakenham, while nobly intentioned, seemed to falsely believe that superior training, discipline and breeding alone could bring an Army to victory in spite of overwhelming adversity. He gave his life in support of his plan. Indeed, his last words are perhaps the most telling indication of the battle’s outcome in his mind: “Lost for the lack of courage.”162
Works Cited
1. Brands, H.W. Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times. New York: Random House, 2005. 2. Brooks, Charles. The Siege of New Orleans. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961. 3. Brown, Wilburt. The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815. University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1969. 4. Buchanan, John. Jackson's Way: Andrew Jackson and the People of the Western Waters. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001. 5. Carter III, Samuel. Blaze of Glory: The Fight for New Orleans, 1814-1815. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971. 6. Cooke, John. A Narrative of Events in the South of France, and of the Attack on New Orleans, in 1814 and 1815. London: T. W. Boone, 1835. http://books.google.com/ books?id=E0r5kY5CDj0C 7. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-0, Operations. Washington: GPO, June 2001. 8. Groom, Winston. Patriotic Fire: Andrew Jackson and Jean Laffite at the Battle of New Orleans. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006. 9. Remini, Robert. The Life of Andrew Jackson. New York: Harper & Row, 1988. 10. Surtees, William. Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade. Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1833. http://books.google.com/books?id=vL_5Gemj3DcC 11. United States Military Academy. Map of The Battle of New Orleans. West Point: History Department, 2010. departments/history/Atlases/ 1812/1812GIF/NewOrleansBattle.gif
1 Samuel Carter III, Blaze of Glory: The Fight for New Orleans, 1814-1815 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), 278. 2 Ibid. 3 Robert Remini, The Life of Andrew Jackson, (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 100. 4 Charles Brooks, The Siege of New Orleans, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), 214. 5 Ibid., 216. 6 Carter, 252. 7 Remini, 100. 8 Carter, 232. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 241. 11 Winston Groom, Patriotic Fire: Andrew Jackson and Jean Laffite at the Battle of New Orleans, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 182. 12 Groom, 182. 13 Carter, 241. 14 Brooks, 229 15 Carter, 244. 16 Wilburt Brown, The Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815, (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1969), 149. 17 Brooks, 212. 18 Carter, 240. 19 Brooks, 220. 20 Carter, 244. 21 Ibid., 233. 22 Groom, 183. 23 William Surtees, Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1833), 369. http://books.google.com/books?id=vL_5Gemj3DcC 24 Carter, 239. 25 Brown, 143. 26 Carter, 243. 27 Ibid., 245. 28 Ibid., 250. 29 Ibid., 244. 30 John Buchanan, Jackson's Way: Andrew Jackson and the People of the Western Waters, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2001), 356. 31 Carter, 244. 32 Brooks, 224. 33 Surtees, 372-73. 34 Carter, 249. 35 Brown, 151. 36 Carter, 249. 37 Brooks, 229. 38 Brooks, 221. 39 Carter, 242, 250. 40 Brooks, 228. 41 Carter, 251. 42 Ibid., 250-51. 43 Brooks, 227. 44 Groom, 191. 45 Brooks, 231. 46 Brown, 149. 47 Brooks, 231. 48 Carter, 251-52 49 Ibid., 251, 253. 50Ibid., 253. 51 Ibid. 52 Brooks, 232. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid., 233. 56 Carter, 254. 57 Brown, 150. 58 Carter, 255. 59 Buchanan, 357. 60 Carter, 254. 61 Brooks 233. 62 Ibid., 234. 63 Ibid. 64 Carter, 254. 65 Brooks, 234. 66 Carter, 255. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Brooks, 236. 70 Brown, 148. 71 Groom, 190. 72 Carter, 258. 73 Buchanan, 359. 74 Groom, 198. 75 Carter, 258. 76 Ibid., 260. 77 Brooks, 234. 78 Ibid., 235. 79 Ibid. 80 Carter, 255. 81 Ibid., 256. 82 Ibid. 83 Carter, 258. 84 Surtees, 376. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid., 377. 88 Brooks, 239. 89 Carter, 256. 90 Buchanan, 361. 91 Carter, 259. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Carter, 260. 95 Ibid. 96 Brooks, 241. 97 Ibid., 243. 98 Ibid., 244. 99 H.W. Brands, Andrew Jackson: His Life and Times, (New York: Random House, 2005), 441. 100 Carter, 260. 101 Remini, 102. 102 Brooks, 245. 103 Brooks, 247. 104 John Cooke, A Narrative of Events in the South of France, and of the Attack on New Orleans , in 1814 and 1815, (London: T. W. Boone, 1835), 235. http://books.google.com/books?id=E0r5kY5CDj0C 105 Carter, 260. 106 Remini, 103. 107 Carter, 261. 108 Ibid. 109 Brown, 156. 110 Carter, 262. 111 Brown, 151. 112 Ibid. 113 Carter, 278. Actual numbers – KIA: 381, DOW: 477, WIA (permanent): 1217, WIA (temporary): 1251; Total: 3,326 114 Ibid. 115 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations, (Washington: GPO, June) 2001, 7-4. 116 Ibid., 7-5. 117 Brown, 149. 118 Ibid., 148. 119 Groom, 195. 120 Buchanan, 356. 121 Department of the Army, 7-27. 122 Ibid., 7-4. 123 Carter, 232. 124 Ibid, 243. 125 Brown, 143. 126 Carter, 252. 127 Brown, 143. 128 Department of the Army, 7-6. 129 Brooks, 221. 130 Ibid., 235. 131 Remini, 101. 132 Department of the Army, 7-6. 133 Remini, 102. 134 Brooks, 247. 135 Department of the Army, 7-6. 136 Surtees, 377. 137 Groom, 198. 138 Brooks, 233. 139 Brands, 441. 140 Department of the Army, 7-6. 141 Groom, 183. 142 Rennie’s column, the 93rd and 95th under Keane, the 44th, 21st, and 4th under Gibbs, the 7th and 43rd under Lambert, the West Indian detachment, and Dickson’s batteries. 143 Ibid., 190. 144 Groom, 195. 145 Brown, 148. 146 Brooks, 232-33. 147 Ibid. 148 Cooke, 230-35. 149 Surtees, 372-73. 150 Groom, 193. 151 Carter, 157. 152 Department of the Army, 4-10 to 4-11. 153 Carter, 151. 154 Brooks, 227. 155 Carter, 251. 156 Brown, 149. 157 Ibid. 158 Books, 240. 159 Carter, 261. 160 Groom, 199. 161 Brooks, 240. 162 Carter, 261. ABSTRACT
The Battle of New Orleans, one of the most decisive land battles in history, was indisputably the most significant American victory of the War of 1812. On the battlefields of Chalmette plantation, just south of the city, the British Army suffered their worst loss ever in proportion to their numbers. In less than 30 minutes, British casualties in the main assault numbered upwards of 3,000 while those of the American defenders totaled less than 60 – only 13 killed. The Americans constructed a staunch earthwork defense, but their ill-equipped and motley crew of Indians, pirates, and farmer-militia should not have challenged the better trained, armed and seasoned British veterans that they faced. A close analysis of British tactics, both during and immediately prior to the main assault on January 8th, 1815, through the lens of current U.S. Army Doctrine, demonstrates a complete failure to incorporate what we now consider to be the Characteristics of Offensive Operations: Concentration, Surprise, Tempo and Audacity. The Army’s keystone operations manual, FM 3-0, explains that Doctrine is “a common language and … understanding of how Army forces conduct operations.” While modern Doctrine is focused on providing a framework for today’s military professionals in a contemporary operating environment, it is “rooted in time-tested Principles” and is “adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions.” As such, what we today call the Characteristics of Offensive Operations are, in fact, timeless principles that accurately reflect necessities for offensive success throughout the history of warfare. Failure to account for any one principle can lead to defeat, but neglect for all for makes it a near certainty. The British made a poor effort to Concentrate their effects on a decisive point on the battlefield. Their actions prior to the battle made Surprise essentially impossible. Incessant stalling in the American engagement area gave the British no control over the tempo of the fight. The greatest failure, though, was the improper use of Audacity, defined as “a simple plan of action, boldly executed; ” the exceptionally complicated British plan was impossible to execute boldly without being simultaneously reckless. This paper attempts to justify each of these claims through analysis of the evidence and close reading of U.S. Army Doctrine on Offensive Operations. The intended purpose is that current and future military professionals understand the British failure, how their inadequacies apply even today, and how to apply Doctrine – which inhabits an academic world of theoretical warfare – to real-world situations across time.
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